This paper explores the interrelation between health and work decisions of older workers. For this, two issues are of relevance. Firstly, health and work may be endogenously related because of direct effects of health on work and vice versa, and because of unobservables that may relate observed health and work outcomes. Secondly, social surveys usually contain self-assessed health measures and research indicates that these may be affected by endogenous, state-dependent, reporting behavior. A solution to the 'Health and Retirement Nexus' requires an integrated model for work decisions, health production and health-reporting mechanisms. We formulate such a model and estimate it on a longitudinal dataset of Dutch elderly.
Introduction
This paper aims to explore the interrelation between health and labor supply decisions of older workers. For this, two issues are of relevance. Firstly, health and work may be endogenously related because there are direct effects of health on work and vice versa, and because there are unobservables that may relate observed health and work outcomes (e.g. through an individual's time preference or previous investments in human capital and health capital). Secondly, in addition to this 'classical' endogeneity problem, there are problems with the measurement of the health status in social surveys.
Social surveys usually contain self-reports on work-related health measures and/or more objective indicators of an individual's general health (such as whether an individual has a certain chronic condition, whether an individual has difficulties performing daily activities etc). The problem with an objective indicator of general health is that parameter estimates in labor supply models are subject to errors in variable bias if these objective measures are not perfectly correlated with work-related health. On the other hand, self-reports on health may depend on the labor market status of the respondent. There may, for instance, be economic motives or individuals may rationalize inactivity by claiming that they can't work. Reporting health as a major determinant for inactivity is socially more accepted and eligibility conditions for some Social Security Benefits, notably Disability Insurance Benefits, are contingent upon bad health (Bound, 1991) . So, individuals out of work may be inclined to overstate health problems. This 'state-dependent' reporting behavior of some individuals implies that it may be dangerous to use subjective health measures to characterize the health condition of respondents.
It also implies that, used in empirical models of labor supply, these measures tend to overestimate the effect of health and to underestimate the effect of economic incentives. The relevance of this reporting bias will differ across countries and it will depend on the accessibility and generosity of the DI programs in these countries.
Most European countries have Social Security systems that discourage continued work of older workers (see for instance the country studies by Gruber and Wise (1997) and the references listed therein). The Netherlands is an extreme case, both in terms of observed retirement patterns as well as in terms of the characteristics of the institutional setting. Since the mid-seventies of the past century, labor force participation rates of elderly males (55 years and older) have dropped 40% points to a current level of about 40%. Employer provided Early Retirement (ER) schemes allow for retirement at the age of 60, or sometimes even earlier. In addition to these schemes there are Unemployment Insurance schemes (UI) and Disability Insurance schemes (DI). It has been argued that notably the DI system, though not designed for this purpose, has been used explicitly as an alternative route for retirement, with the consent of worker and employer organization and the DI administrators (see for instance, Aarts and de Jong (1992) ).
Strong incentive effects of DI schemes have also been found for a number of other countries.
Riphahn (1998) finds evidence for the substitution between UI and DI schemes in Germany. Bound and Burkhauser (2000) argued that labor supply considerations may have played an important role in the decision to apply for Disability benefits for workers in the United States, the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany. More specifically, they state: "the prevalence of disability transfer recipients per worker has increased at all working ages over the last quarter of the century in the United States and in the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany. This coincides with an increase in both access to and the generosity of publicly provided social insurance and social welfare programs targeted at people with disabilities in the industrialized world". This implies that, in most countries, the stock of DI recipients may consist of individuals who are in poor health and of individuals who are in good health, with consequences for applied research in labor economics and health economics.
The above implies that an analysis of the interrelation between health and work requires a model for work decisions, health and health-reporting. We formulate such a model and estimate it on Dutch longitudinal data. Our model generates consistent estimates of the effect of health and financial incentives on work, of the effect of work (history) on health and of the size of the reporting errors in a self-reported health measure that is available in most social surveys. In addition, the health-reporting model provides a procedure to eliminate systematic, state-dependent, reporting errors from subjective health data. The results are of interest for the retirement literature, the health economics literature and public policy. To mention a few issues: the method to eliminate reporting errors from subjective data is of direct use for the health economics literature on the measurement of health and/or the decomposition of inequality in health (see for instance, Cutler & Richardson (1997) or Van Doorslaer & Jones (2003) . Since Grossman (1972) , various 'health production' models have been specified (e.g. Cropper (1977) , Ehrlich & Chuma (1990) ). However, there is surprisingly little work that confronts these models with observed data 1 . Most proposed Social Security and Pension system reforms aim at increasing labor force participation rates by making retirement financially less attractive and by suggesting more individualized (capital) funded retirement plans. Seen from this perspective it is for
Pension and Health Care policy important to know how increased work efforts will affect current and future health levels.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a general outline of our joint model for health, work decisions and health reporting. Section 3 presents the data, the empirical implementation of the model and the likelihood function. This section also contains a brief description of the Dutch institutions, as this is most important for the implementation of our labor supply model. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes.
1 An exception is Sickles & Yazbeck (1998) . We discuss this paper in a later section.
The model
In order to study the interrelation between health and work empirically, we need to specify a model that addresses the methodological issues mentioned in the previous section. More specifically, the model should describe how work and work history affect health and how health and financial incentives affect labor force participation decisions of older workers. In addition, the model should account for systematic, state-dependent, reporting of the extent to which health problems limit the ability to perform work. This section presents the general structure of the model. The empirical implementation will be discussed in section 3.
The key variables of the model are the labor market status and the health status of the individual. The labor market status S it is a dummy variable indicating the labor market state person i is observed in at time t. In the Dutch context, the relevant labor market states are Work, Unemployed
Insurance (UI), Disability Insurance (DI) and Early Retirement (ER). We will be more specific about the Dutch institutions when implementing the model. With respect to health we make a distinction between a variable describing the general health condition of an individual and a more specific variable (labeled as 'work-related health') that indicates whether health limits the kind and amount of work that an individual can do. The variable for the general health status of the respondent (H o ) will be used to model the effect of work decisions on health. For the effect of health on work a workrelated health measure is required (Bazzoli (1985) , Stern (1989 ), Bound (1991 ). In principle, a direct question regarding 'health-related work' would be perfect for this, if it where not the case that the response to this question may depend on the labor market status of the individual. This 'statedependent reporting' makes the observed indicator for health endogenous to the labor supply decision.
Our model will therefore make a distinction between the measured, but biased, variable H w and the unobserved latent 'true health' H* that contains the relevant information for the labor supply decision and that is free from 'state-dependent reporting'.
At this point it is important to note that surveys typically lack objective measures for work related health. Instead, for general health objective indicators are readily available 2 . Our measure for general health H o is defined to be an objective measure and we will exploit this in our health-reporting model. We will now be more specific about the relationships between the key variables of our model (S, H o , H w and H*).
Without being too explicit about the functional forms of our labor supply model we can write:
where j stands for one of the possible labor market states, e.g. employed, unemployed, disabled or early retired. The vector Z may include exogenous variables like age, gender and education, but will also contain previous labor market status and financial incentives associated with the specific labor supply choices. There is a huge literature that deals with the importance of financial incentives in explaining retirement decisions. This paper is not the place to give a full account of all the relevant papers in this area and we therefore refer to, for instance, the surveys by Hurd (1990), or Lumsdaine and Mitchell (2000) . There is a consensus that financial incentives are important for the retirement decision and that generous retirement schemes of the Social Security and Pension System have induced many older workers to retire early (see for instance the country projects of Blondahl and Scarpetta 1998; Gruber & Wise, 1997) . This is important for the specification of our empirical labor supply model (we return to this in section 3). As Z may also contain the previous labor market position, the labor supply model (2.1) may also be used to model labor market transitions.
The use of the latent variable H* in (2.1) rather than the observed variable H w eliminates potential endogeneity bias due to state-dependent differences in health reporting behavior. The variables ξ j are individual effects. They will be modeled as random effects that are allowed to be correlated between different labor market states.
The impact of work on health is modeled by the following equation:
where η o is an individual unobserved specific effect that may be correlated with the ξ j of equation (2.1). X o is a vector of exogenous variables. The sequence of previous labor market states will typically enter this equation as statistics summarizing the individual's labor market history, such as the number of years worked within a specified time frame.
Models for the production of health, such as Grossman (1972) and other models based on his seminal work (e.g. Cropper 1977; Ehrlich & Chuma 1990; Sickles & Yazbeck 1998) can be used as a theoretical basis for our model (2.1) and (2.2). From these papers, Sickles & Yazbeck (1998) is closest to our contribution. They specify and structurally estimate a model for the demand for leisure and the production of health. Their main interest is in the effect of medical consumption on health and the effect of general health on the demand for leisure by elderly. As argued by Bazzoli (1985) and Bound (1991) , health as far as it is related to work is of importance for work (leisure) decisions and the estimated health effect may be biased towards zero if the variable used in the analyses is not perfectly correlated with the work-related health measure. Therefore, our model for labor supply (2. 
The observed impact of changes of one's labor market state S on the observed value of H w may reflect a causal effect of work on the occurrence of health problems (this runs via H * ), but may also (via the mechanisms described in the introduction) result from state-dependent differences in health reporting.
For the latter effect S is included on the right hand side of equation (2.3).
Again, H* is not observed. Therefore, in order to identify the reporting effect of changes of work status S on reported health from the true causal effect of work on health, we need an extra assumption.
We assume that: Figure 1 summarizes the relationships between the key variables of the model. As described in the introduction, the analysis of the relation between health and work decisions of older workers is not straightforward for two reasons: (1) the usual endogeneity problems associated with the simultaneity between the variables of interest and (2) systematic measurement errors in the observed work-related health measure. Mutual causality is taken into account by explicitly modeling the effect of health on work and the effect of work (history) on health, allowing for possibly correlated unobserved individual effects (the η 's and ξ's). We specify a health-reporting model that accounts for endogenous reporting behavior and state an assumption that allows us to separate the state-dependent measurement error from observed self-reported measures for work-related health. The full model consists of three models that are estimated jointly. We refer to section 3 for the implementation of the model and the likelihood function. Before we turn to this, we would like to make two additional remarks.
Firstly, the true work-related health variable H* is a latent variable. Rather than including its value, as was done in equation (2.1), it may sometimes be more convenient to make S dependent on the probability density function of H*. Using P* as shorthand notation for this density function, the alternative specification would be:
In the empirical application we will use this specification as it allows us to obtain estimates that are readily comparable to more straightforward estimates using the subjective measure H w . Secondly, our model relates to previous contributions in the health and retirement literature.
Sickles and Taubman (1986) have a joint model for health and retirement, but they do not deal with the issue of reporting errors. Moreover, in their model there is no effect of work on health. Bound et al. (1999) , focus on the effect of (lagged) health on labor force participation behavior of elderly. There is quite a literature that deals with the issue of response biases in subjective health measures. In order to eliminate the systematic bias in health responses, various authors have used measures that are believed to be more objective, such as, observed future death of respondents in the sample (Parsons (1982) , Anderson and Burkhauser (1985) ) or sickness absenteeism records (Burkhauser 1979) . As pointed out previously, work-related health is of importance and parameter estimates in retirement models are subject to errors in variable bias if these objective measures of general health are not perfectly correlated with work-related health. The use of lagged responses to health questions or an instrumental variable method as proposed by Stern (1989) , Aarts and de Jong (1992) or Dwyer and Mitchell (1998) is also of little help, since this does not eliminate the bias due to state-dependent reporting behavior 4 .
Our health-reporting model is as in Kerkhofs & Lindeboom (1995) and is similar to Kreider (1999) . Both studies use more objective health information to filter out differences in response behavior across labor market states. The main problem with the approaches of Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) and Kreider (1999) is that their models will fail to produce consistent estimates of the bias in selfreported health, in the case that there are unobservables that affect both health and work. This problem is solved when the reporting model is integrated into a model of health and work, as in the current paper See also above, as in the application of Bound et al (1999) , these authors relate H w to a range of health indicators and socio-demographic variables and use estimates of this model to instrument H w directly. This may eliminate the classical endogeneity bias, but it will not deal with the bias due to state-dependent reporting behavior if one does not explicitly control for this. We refer to section 3.2. for our instrumenting procedure. 5 In the terminology of our model: Kerkhofs & Lindeboom (1995) and Kreider (1999) exceed the fraction of those who are ultimately awarded benefits. The hypothesis is tested on a sub sample of individuals who applied for Disability Insurance and for whom both the SSA's award or deny decision is observed. It is concluded that for the U.S. one can not reject the hypothesis that the selfreported disability is an unbiased indicator of the SSA's award decision. We could have used this procedure first to test for the reliability of H w , but have not done this for a number of reasons. Firstly, we do not have access to data of individuals for whom we can observe both the DI application decision and the ultimate award decision. Secondly, it may be questionable whether there exists a common social standard or norm towards DI in countries like the Netherlands where large differences exists in DI rates across different subgroups (i.e. generations) of the population. Finally, and related to the previous point, the stringency of the award/deny decision of the SSA may change over time. This may be particularly relevant for the European countries. Disability recipient rates of elderly males for The Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and the U.S. are 24%, 18%, 14% and 7%, respectively. Indeed, these relatively high European disability rates have triggered political pressure towards Social Security reforms in these countries. The consequence of this is that the SSA's standard applied to the stock of DI recipients (at the time of their inflow) may differ from the current (at the time of interview) standards Internal evaluations of item non-response and representativity of the first wave of data show them to be of high quality. In general, item non-response was not a problem. Non-response was, however, relatively high for the income questions, with a non-response rate of up to 30 percent for some income sources. The CERRA data were compared to data from Statistics Netherlands and found to be comparable based on age, sex, labor market status, and education.
The health variables in the CERRA data include the commonly used subjective measures based on responses to questions like "how good would you rate your health" and "does your health limit you in your ability to work". Responses to the latter question are often used as a health indicator in labor supply and retirement studies and is in this paper used as the subjective work-related health measure H w . Less subjective health indicators in the CERRA data include the number of visits to a physician in the past 12 months, whether the respondent was hospitalized in the past 12 months, whether the respondent has a chronic condition and if so, what condition, and the items of the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL).
The HSCL is a validated objective test of general health used in the medical sciences to assess the psycho-neurotic and somatic pathology of patients (respondents). The HSCL consists of 57 items and is known to have an excellent rate of external consistency, meaning that the test results are highly correlated with objective medical reports on the patients' health status. The responses to these 57 items result in a mental score, a physical score and a total health score. In the empirical analysis we will use the total health score as the general health measure H o . The advantage of this HSCL measure, over the response to a direct question concerning an individual's health, is that it is less sensitive to reporting errors that may depend on the respondent's labor market status. As a general health score it is however not immediately suitable as an indicator of health-related problems that affect labor supply and retirement decisions. Average HSCL score Table 1 shows how both health variables are related to respondents' labor market status.
Respondents who are in the disability scheme on average have considerably higher scores for both health variables. The unemployed score slightly higher than the employed. Interestingly, the HSCL score shows that the general health condition of the early retired is on average better than for workers, although they report more health-related problems with respect to their ability to perform work. Table A1 contains some further descriptive statistics of the dataset that is used in the empirical application. 
Empirical Specification

Health reporting
The subjective health variable H w is the response to the question "Does your health limit you in your ability to work?" with response categories (1) not problems, (2) slight problems (3) have difficulties with work, and (4) cannot work at all. As there are strong reasons to believe that responses to this question may depend on the respondent's labor market status, one may specify a reporting equation that allows for differential response behavior across the different labor market states S:
The threshold levels c k are defined as:
c 0 = -∞ and c 4 = ∞. Note that in (3.2) the labor market status S is allowed to have a different effect on each threshold. This specification follows Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) . Using assumption 1 we have:
If we further assume that the distribution of H * is a normal distribution with variance 1 and mean:
where Φ is the standard normal distribution function. For exogenous variables that are both in X w and X* only the difference in the parameters is identified. We therefore make the arbitrary assumption that 
Below we illustrate how equation (3.6) is used to generate a measure for work-related health that is free of state-dependent reporting behavior and that can be used in a model for labor force participation behavior of older workers.
Labor force participation
Current participation rates of Dutch elderly (55+) are a little above 40%, whereas only a few decades ago (in the late nineteen seventies) participation rates exceeded 80%. There is strong evidence that a substantive part of the massive drop in the participation rates of Dutch elderly has been caused by incentives provided by Dutch Institutions. We refer for a more detailed description of the Dutch 7 In this respect it is interesting to note that Kerkhofs & Lindeboom (1995) found that the assumption that the effect on H w is not due to differences in reporting behavior (is in X*, but not in X w ) was only rejected for labor market status S.
Institutions to Appendix B of this paper. For now we briefly note that early retirement is facilitated by social security provided Unemployment Insurance (UI) and Disability Insurance (DI) and employer provided Early Retirement (ER) schemes. Kapteyn and De Vos (1998) and Lindeboom (1999) calculated implicit tax rates for ER, UI and DI schemes in the Netherlands 8
. Maximum implicit tax rates of UI and DI schemes are about 60% and peak at age 58.
9 Calculations (Kapteyn and De Vos 1998) showed that the implicit tax rates for ER schemes in the Netherlands can exceed even 100%
and that the implicit tax rates 'peak' (i.e. that it is financially most attractive, Coile & Gruber (2000) ) at the very moment that a worker becomes eligible for an ER scheme
10
. This implies that for our model it will be important to deal explicitly with the individual's eligibility status for an ER scheme.
Fortunately, our data provide this information.
The labor market status S it is modeled by transition rates describing the probability that an individual at work at time t-2 is in one of the four labor market states (Work, UI, DI or ER) at time t.
In the empirical application we model the transitions of workers in 1991 to their observed position in 1993, and for the subgroup of respondents who also work in 1993 to their observed labor market state in 1995
11
. The transition rates are specified as multinomial logit probabilities with random individual effects. If an individual is eligible for an early retirement scheme at time t, the transition probabilities are defined as:
8 Defined as the change in the present discounted value of retirement income when retirement is postponed with one year, relative to (net) yearly wages. See also the NBER project on incentives and retirement around the world by Gruber and Wise (1997) and in particular the contribution of Kapteyn and De Vos (1998) . 9 The peak is due to the fact that from age 58 onwards unemployed and disabled workers can collect wage related (70% of last earned gross wage) benefits until the mandatory retirement age (65). At younger ages there is a maximum duration of entitlement to wage-related unemployment and disability benefits (5 years), after which benefits fall to a lower (Social-Assistence) level. 10 In the 1990's ER benefits were on average 80% of last earned gross wages and once eligible, delayed retirement did not lead to higher replacement rates. 11 We implicitly use the assumption that once out of work people remain out of work. 
If the respondent is not eligible for early retirement scheme, the transition probabilities are:
The reference category is 'Work': With the incorporation of the eligibility status in the transition probabilities, we aim to control for the change in the financial incentives once an ER scheme becomes available to an individual. In addition, we will include wages and benefit levels (to be discussed in more detail in section 4) in the set of controls (Z) along with the usual controls such as age education etc. The state-dependent individual effects (the ξ's) are random variables that may be correlated with the other random effects in the model 12 . The model does not include lagged health outcomes (health history) such as in Bound et al. (1999) . Unfortunately, we were not in the position to do this as we only had access to two waves of a panel survey. This means that the health effects in our model only concern contemporaneous health upon re-entering employment. 12 Note that the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) of the multinomial logit model is relaxed when the unobservable ξ's are included in the model. effects and that the (long-run) effects of previous health outcomes are absorbed in the unobserved individual components (ξ k ).
For the function g(P*) we use the probability that an individual's health problems make it difficult or almost impossible to work (for H w this is response category 3 or 4), and we use the reporting thresholds of the workers to calculate this probability. The idea is that workers do not have a motive to overstate health problems and that they therefore report without error
13
. More specifically,
we specify g(P*) as:
The counterfactual eliminates the effect of state-dependent reporting that would bias the estimates of the labor supply model if we simply had used H w . The function g(P*) may therefore be considered as a 'cleansed' measure of work-related health. Moreover, the choice of g(.) is convenient, as this makes the estimate of γ s directly comparable to estimates of the labor supply model when a dummy variable for bad health (H w =3 or 4) is used.
Our sample consists of individuals who had a paid job in 1991. This sample selection could bias the estimates of the labor force participation model. We therefore add a reduced form equation describing the probability of being at work in the initial year 1991, conditional on exogenous variables V i and a random individual effect µ i that may be correlated with the other individual effects:
Impact of work on health Equation (2.2), describing the effect of the labor market history on health (H o ), is modeled by a random effect linear regression specification:
where f is the probability density of the standard normal distribution. The function f is a linear function of indicators summarizing the respondent's labor market history.
Likelihood function
The model presented in the previous section contains six unobserved individual-specific effects. The conditional logit model (3.7' and 3.7'') for the labor market status includes ξi UI , ξi DI and ξi ER , the initial conditions equation (3.9) includes µi and the health reporting model (3.6) and the health production model (3.10) include ηi and ηi o , respectively. For the latter two we assume a one-factor error specification. More specifically, we take ηi
) the likelihood function is simply the product of the likelihood contributions of the multinomial logit specification of the respondent's labor market situation in 1993 and 1995 (eqs. (3.7') and (3.7'')), the ordered Probit specification for the subjective work-related health measure in 1993 and 1995 (eq.
(3.6)), the linear regression specification of the HSCL-score in 1993 and 1995 (eq. (3.10) ) and the logit model describing whether or not the respondent had a paid job in 1991 (eq. 3.9). 1 Retirement is assumed to be an absorbing state. This is implied by Dutch Institutions and confirmed by the data (see also the footnote in section 3.2). This means that, once out of work, people remain out of work with probability 1. So implicitly, non-working individuals are not used anymore in the estimation of the labour supply model. They are, however, still used for the estimation of the parameters of the health production and the health reporting model.
The empirical analysis
The equations for work, health reporting and health production are stochastically related (by means of the unobserved individual components). The model for work and health reporting are also directly related as estimates of the latter model are used to construct a cleansed health measure g(P*) (see equation (3.8)). The three models are estimated jointly and the construction of the cleansed health measure takes place within each iteration of the optimization procedure. Below we present the results of the different models. We start with the results of the model for labor force participation of older workers. 
Labor force participation
The second panel of the table includes a set of financial variables that are expected to be of direct relevance for the transition out of work. One variable relates the stream of retirement incomes from immediate retirement via a specific exit route, relative to the stream of incomes associated with continued work up to the age of mandatory retirement (65). For an ER scheme this variable will measure the effect of the level of the benefit, conditional on eligibility for the ER scheme 16 See for this also the specification of the labor force participation model in section 3.2. The eligibility status of the individual directly changes the specification of the labor force participation model (cf equation (3.7') and (3.7'')).
In this second part of the table we also included a variable for the availability of an early retirement scheme within the firm. This variable is included to capture some of the effects of the availability of a very generous future option (see Stock & Wise 1990) . We expect this variable to decrease the probability of entering into less generous DI and UI schemes as it may be rewarding to postpone retirement up to the time that an individual becomes eligible for an ER scheme.
Indeed, table 2a reveals that availability of an ER scheme significantly lowers the probability that an individual enters into a DI scheme. Hence DI schemes and ER schemes appear to be retirement options that compete with each other. No such effects are found for UI schemes. It is important to note that both ER and UI schemes are financed from sector funds and that it was common practice for employers to provide laid-off workers with a bonus on top of their UI benefit up to the time that they qualified for an ER scheme. Our results do not reject this idea
17
. 17 The sectoral funds are formed from employer and worker contributions and until recently there was no experience rating. The results also imply that it will in general be difficult to distinguish the separate incentive effects from ER and UI schemes. The model is estimated with simulated maximum likelihood methods (50 drawings).
3
Probability of bad health, cleansed measure from the health-reporting model, cf. equation (3.8).
4
Stream of benefit incomes up to the age of normal retirement divided by the wage stream associated with continued work (logarithm).
The coefficients of the financial incentive variables have the correct sign, but are not significant for either of the exit routes. For UI and DI, this may be due to the relatively small number of transitions that we observe through these channels. Alternatively, there may be little variation in the replacement rate as a substantial fraction of new UI and DI recipients qualify for wage related benefits of 70% up to the Mandatory retirement age (age 65). We also experimented with other specifications for entrance into a UI and DI scheme, such as the maximum gain in income from postponing retirement as opposed to immediate retirement (the option value, Stock and Wise 1990 ).
This proved not to be a better specification. Apparently, much of the reward of postponing retirement is captured by the dummy variable indicating the availability of an ER scheme and the flexible age function (reported in the upper panel).
The small and insignificant effect of the financial incentive variable for the ER scheme is due to the fact that this variable measures the incentive effect, conditional on eligibility for the ER scheme. We previously referred to the work of Kapteyn and de Vos (1998) and Lindeboom (1999) , who showed that the implicit tax rate 'peaked' at the very moment that an individual becomes eligible for an ER scheme. The replacement rates for these ER schemes are in general very high (on average 80% of last earned gross wages) and postponement of retirement does not lead to higher replacement rates. Indeed, the larger part of the workers collect ER benefits at the very moment that they become eligible and simple calculations with the model confirm this 18 .
Of particular interest for this paper is the effect of health on work. The cleansed health index g(.) is used as an instrument for 'true' work-related health. The estimates of Table 2a suggest for each exit route strong significant effects of health on labor market behavior. All coefficients are negative implying that bad health outcomes are associated with higher probabilities of being in a non-working 18 Simple calculation with the model show that the probability of entering into an ER schemes is relatively high as compared to the probability of entering into an UI or a DI scheme (cf the constants of the model in Table 2a ).
state. The size of the coefficients is not informative in itself and we therefore want to relate the results of Table 2a to results from a simple, naïve, model where the response to the health question (H w ) is directly included. We report estimates of the latter model in Table A4 of the Appendix. Table A4 gives health coefficients (with absolute t-values in parentheses) of -0.826 (3.6), -4.179 (17.25) and -0.511 (2.13) for UI, DI and ER, respectively. These estimates, as expected, indicate that health is by far the strongest factor for people on a Disability Insurance scheme. We re-scaled the health coefficients in Table 2a with the average difference in the value of the cleansed health measure between respondents reporting bad health and respondents reporting good health. This was done in order to make the coefficients of Table A4 and Table 2a comparable. After re-scaling, the health coefficients of Table 2a become -2.131, -2.261 and -0.571, for UI, DI and ER, respectively. A direct comparison of these numbers with the numbers in Table A4 reveals that for DI recipients the use of the biased self-reports on health leads to exaggerated effects of health on work (it drops from -4.179
to -2.261). The use of a self-reported measure also seems to downplay the effect of financial incentives for DI recipients. The effects of the financial incentive variable in Table A4 is less then half of the corresponding coefficient of Table 2a (1.946 versus 5.12). For UI recipients the effect of health becomes more pronounced, whereas it remains approximately the same for ER recipients. , the score of the Hopkins Symptom Checklist) are used to generate a (latent) health index. The actual reporting behavior depends on the index and the thresholds, which are allowed to depend on labor market status. The subjective work-related health measure H w is a categorical variable which may take on values ranging from 1 (no problems at all) to 4 (can't work at all). We start with a discussion of the estimates of the threshold reported in Table 2b . The first threshold ψ 1 for workers is estimated at −0.568. In Table 2b the lowest threshold for the unemployed, disabled and early retired are presented relative to this value. Similarly, for the second and third thresholds Table 2b reports the increments between that and the first lower threshold. The results of the table are used to calculate the threshold levels and we depict these in Figure 3 . The results on the thresholds indicate that there are indeed strong reporting effects for DI recipients. Conditional on the individual's health status (H o ) and additional controls, DI recipients report significantly more towards bad health. It is interesting to note that the lower bounds of UI and ER recipients (c 1 ) are higher than the lower bound of the workers. This means that they are more inclined to report towards good health then the workers. Note however, that for unemployed workers the increments in the bounds are small, implying that unemployed are less likely to report category 2
Health reporting
("little problems with work") and 3 ("Difficulties with work"). Relative to the workers, the unemployed are more inclined to report that they can't work at all, or that they experience no problems (the third threshold for UI recipients is lower then the third bound for workers and the reverse holds for the first threshold). For ER recipients one would say that, apart from response category 1, their reporting behavior is very similar to that of the workers. , but yet about 24% of the Dutch elderly (above 55) are in a DI scheme.
This is more three times as high as the DI rate for the U.S (7%).
We also estimated a simple ordered Probit model, where we did not take the endogeneity of the labor market status and the HSCL score on the right hand side of our reporting model into account. The results of this model are reported in Table A5 . The coefficients on the reporting bounds in this table indicate that the results become even more extreme. The first bound of the disabled is almost 2 points lower then the first bound of the workers so that a cleansed measure based on this model would even imply a larger share of healthy DI recipients. This is due to unobserved differences that exist between workers and DI recipients. This also indicates that the previous results of the 19 Life expectancy of Dutch elderly is among the highest of the world. models estimated by Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) and Kreider (1999) and then return to the total (direct and indirect) effect of work history on work-related health. Table 2c reports the results for the health production model. Low values of the HSCL score are associated with good health; high values are associated with bad health. The older age groups and individuals with a partner appear to be the healthiest. It is good to bear in mind that age represents a pure age effect and a cohort effect. The education variables suggest that the reference group (those with only primary school) is the least healthy. Interestingly, and in line with other research, we find that higher incomes are associated with better health. Work history is assumed to be captured by a third order polynomial in the total number of months ever worked and the number of months worked in the past 10 years. The latter is included to capture effects from recent work efforts on health. To illustrate the effect of work history on the general health status, we calculated the health profile of an average worker with about 15 years of work experience and who remains at work for a number of years. Figure 5a gives a graphical representation.
Impact of work on health
The values of the calculated HSCL scores of this average worker are in line with observed average HSCL scores of workers in the sample (see Table 1 ). It is clear from Figure 5a that after about months ever worked is about 350 months and more than 75% of the sample has worked over 300 months, so that effectively for most individuals increased work efforts are associated with worse health outcomes. Figure 5b shows the same pattern for a work-related health measure. We used the results of Table 2b to compute the probability that an average individual at work reports to be in bad health g(P*) (see equation (3.8)). Work experience effects this probability directly and indirectly via the HSCL score (see Figure 5a ). Figure 5b shows that work-related health also starts to deteriorate at about 300 months, and that the effect of work experience may be substantial. The probability that a worker reports to be in bad health more than doubles over the time span considered in the figure. 
Conclusions
This paper aims to explore the interrelation between health and work decisions of older workers. For this, two issues are of relevance. Health and work are possibly endogenously related because there are direct effects of health on work and vice versa, and because there are unobservables that may relate observed health and work outcomes. Furthermore, self-assessed health measures are usually at hand in empirical analyses and research indicates that these may be affected by endogenous, state-dependent, reporting behavior. We specify a model that can deal with these issues. The model consists of three stochastically related parts: firstly, a model for work, where together with the usual socio-economic and demographic variables; financial incentives and health are allowed to affect retirement behavior, secondly, a model for health that relates past labor market outcomes to current health levels; thirdly a model for reporting behavior that translates the observed subjective health measure into a health index that is free of state-dependent reporting errors. In turn this cleansed health index is used in the model for work decisions. The model is estimated on a Dutch longitudinal survey using simulated maximum likelihood techniques.
We find that financial incentives are important for the decision to stop working. Workers in the Netherlands have strong incentives to take an employer provided Early Retirement (ER) scheme as soon as they become eligible for this scheme. The eligibility for an ER scheme substantially reduces the probability of early outflow through Disability Insurance (DI) and Unemployment Insurance (UI) schemes. Hence it appears that ER on the one hand and DI and UI schemes on the other hand act as substitutes. We furthermore find strong effects of health on work choices. The direct use of a self-reported measure leads to exaggerated health effects in the labor supply model. This holds notably for DI recipients. This finding is in line with the large and systematic biases in selfreports on health that we find for DI recipients. The health production model reveals that increased work efforts eventually (after about 25 years) lead to a deterioration of health. This finding suggests that pension and social security reforms that aim at increasing labor force participation rates of elderly, may have an adverse effect on the distribution of health among the elderly, with obvious consequences, for instance, for health care consumption at advanced ages. If an individual reports to have difficulties to do his or her job or cannot work at all.
Appendix A
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Logarithm of the stream of benefit incomes up to the age of normal retirement divided by the stream of wage income associated with continued work. and Disability Insurance (DI) programs. Unemployment Insurance programs can be divided into Unemployment Benefit (UB) programs, to provide a safety net for those who lose their income due to involuntary unemployment and social assistance (SA) provisions.
The UB entitlement period depends upon previous job tenure and work experience and lasts up to a maximum of 5 years. Benefit replacement rates are a fixed percentage (70%) of previous gross earnings. Benefit recipients have to be in active search for employment to maintain (full) benefits.
Recipients 57,5 years and older are exempted from the active search requirement. As a result UB is often a source of pre-pension retirement income for elderly workers. At the conclusion of the UB entitlement period, the unemployed can apply for SA. However, the drop in unemployment benefit levels may be substantial as SA benefits are seventy percent of minimum wages (the monthly gross minimum wage was 2,163 Dutch guilders in 1994). SA benefits are provided up to the mandatory retirement age (65 years).
Disability Insurance (DI) is provided to protect those who have a physical and/or mental inability to perform gainful employment. Up to the summer of 1993, benefit levels were 70 percent of gross earnings and in practice were provided up to the mandatory retirement age ( 65 years). Though not designed for that purpose, DI schemes have been used in the past as an exit route for elderly workers (healthy and unhealthy) with consent of the employer, the worker and the DI administrators (see for instance, Aarts and de Jong (1992) ). To reduce the number of DI beneficiaries the government tightened DI regulations in the summer of 1993 and introduced a limited benefit entitlement period and medical examinations at regular times to assess the disability status of the recipient. Due to political pressure beneficiaries 45 years and older were exempted from the tighter rules. Since 1993 the DI entitlement period depends on age and ranges from 0 to 6 years. After this initial entitlement period benefits levels are lowered, according to a function of previous wages, minimum wages and age. 21 For workers of 58 years and older, full DI benefits are provided up to the mandatory age of retirement. Despite the efforts to reduce the inflow into DI schemes, the number of DI claimants continued to grow. In 1970 about 200,000 were enrolled in the DI scheme, in 1980 this has grown to 650,000 and continued to grow to about 900,000 now. Since the mid nineteen eighties the economic recovery has led to a growth of the number of jobs and a steady decline in the number of unemployed (currently about 250,000), but over these years the number of DI recipients continued to grow at a constant speed.
Early Retirement (ER) schemes, introduced in the late seventies, are employer provided schemes and were initially designed as programs to induce the elderly to retire early in order to make room for young unemployed workers. ER replacement rates vary by sector or even by firm, but are generally financially very attractive. The average replacement rate is eighty percent of previous gross earnings and in some cases net replacement rates may be close to one. ER eligibility typically depends on age and/or job tenure. Since 1957 all residents of the Netherlands are entitled to a flat rate social security benefit at age 65. The monthly benefit amount is tied to the government-mandated minimum wage. Almost all workers can supplement these basic social security benefits with mandated employer pension benefits.
